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LIMITS TO STATE REAPPORTIONMENT
THROUGH MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTING
INTRODUCTION
On October 22, 1971, the Legislative Redistricting Board of Texas
promulgated a reapportionment plan for both houses of the Texas Leg-
islature.' This plan was characterized by population deviations of al-
most ten per cent from the mathematically perfect district, 2 and the use
of both multimember and single-member districts. 3  Harris County, con-
taining Houston, was divided into twenty-three single-member districts,
yet, Dallas and Bexar Counties, containing Dallas and San Antonio,
were made into multimember districts. 4
Texas has a 150-member House of Representatives, making the popu-
lation of the mathematically perfect district 74,645. 5 Dallas County
has a population of 1,327,000 citizens, 220,000 of whom are black.6
Ninety per cent of these black voters reside in an area that is ninety per
cent black.7
Bexar County has a population of 830,460,8 some 160,000 of whom
are Mexican-American. 9 This Mexican-American population makes up
1. The Texas Constitution charges the Board with the duty of drawing such
a plan if the Texas Legislature fails to redistrict the state at its first regular session
after the census is published. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28. The Board was ordered
to comply in Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Bd., 471 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971).
2. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 713 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
3. Id. at 718.
Harris County, the largest, is split into 23 single-member districts; all of
the other populous and metropolitan counties are put in multimember dis-
tricts of varying numbers of members, ranging up to 18 for Dallas County.
Three of the 11 multimember districts comprise entire Counties (Travis,
McLennan, and Dallas); in the other eight multimember districts, the dis-
trict lines cut boundaries without rhyme or reason.
Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 713.
6. Brief for Appellee Regester at 28, n.38, White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973).
7. Id.
8. 343 F. Supp. at 730.
9. Id.
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seventy-eight per cent of a section of San Antonio called "the Barrio,"
which represents twenty-four per cent of the county.' 0
Aside from the gaping inconsistency in the treatment accorded Hous-
ton County, the plan raised an ominous issue. On the basis of the above
statistics, it would have been eminently reasonable to assume that single-
member districting of Dallas and Bexar Counties would result in the elec-
tion of three black legislators in Dallas County, and two Mexican-Ameri-
can legislators in Bexar County. Such an assumption was no longer reas-
onable: Indeed, it was now unreasonable, given the fact that the at-
large election of these multimember districted counties made blacks and
Mexican-Americans a small minority in their respective counties.
On November 2, 1971, Diana Regester and others" filed suit alleging
unconstitutional disparities in the population of many House districts,
and invidious discrimination resulting from the use of multimember dis-
tricting.12 A three-judge court was impaneled, and on January 28, 1972,
the district court struck down the Texas plan on both grounds, ordering
Texas to reapportion Dallas and Bexar Counties into single-member
districts in parity with Harris County.'
THE ISSUE
White v. Regester' 4 is another in a now familiar line of cases-reap-
portionment has been the subject of the Court's scrutiny for over a dec-
ade. 15 But, as the Court long ago appreciated,' 6 consideration of the
issue of reapportionment necessarily raises the difficult question of what
constitutes fair representation. 1 7 When district lines are drawn, one won-
ders whether it can be expected that past voting behavior of various con-
stituencies will not be considered--especially given legislators' finely honed
political instincts for survival. Once such lines are drawn, resulting in
the election of one group of legislators, how can a court respond to allega-
tions that the drawing of different lines would have resulted in the elec-
10. Id.
11. Id. at 708-710. Four suits were filed in four district courts between October
22, and November 24. See note 95, infra.
12. 343 F. Supp. at 730.
13. Id. at 704.
14. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
15. The district court had applied the Reynolds standard as it stood in 1972,
unamended by Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973). See note 27, infra.
16. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
17. See R.B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL
PROTECTION (1970? and R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTION-
MENT IN LAW AND POLITICS (1968).
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tion of a different group of legislators? It was for this very reason that
the Court long held the issue to be nonjusticiable, and refused to enter
a "political thicket."' 8
Nonetheless, the Court ultimately discerned that there were two types
of malapportionment. The first, and more widely acknowledged, was
gerrymandering. Gerrymandering most clearly manifested the justiciabil-
ity problem, and actions predicated upon such allegations have been
sustained only given the most blatant of circumstances. 19 In the ab-
sence of such circumstances, the courts have been reluctant for fear of
being accused of judicial gerrymandering. 20
A second type of malapportionment lies in unequally populated dis-
tricts, a once preponderant circumstance in the several states. Through
such geographical malapportionment, rural representation had been exag-
gerated at the expense of urban representation in almost every legisla-
ture in the nation. However, unlike the problems that made gerryman-
dering a nonjusticiable issue, this type of malapportionment was readily
identifiable through mathematical facts. In order for every citizen's
vote to be of equal weight, each district must contain the same number
of citizens. This mathematically perfect district was calculated simply by
dividing the number of legislators to be elected into the total popula-
tion of the state. Any reapportionment plan characterized by districts
with population deviations from the "ideal" district was malapportioned.
This presumed, of course, that mathematically perfect districting was
axiomatically fair representation.
The Supreme Court found this all-pervasive form of malapportionment
to be "within the reach of judicial protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," in 1962,21 put forth the standard of "one-man, one-vote" in 1963,22
and applied it to state legislative apportionment in 1964.23 In the years
18. 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
19. See Edwards, The Gerrymander And "One Man, One Vote," 46 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 879 (1971). See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
20. See Wells v. Rockefeller, 311 F. Supp. 48, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
21. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
22. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). See also Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
23. The Reapportionment Cases: Though Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964), is the best known of these cases, the Court handed down five companion
decisions; Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713; Roman v. Sincock, 377
U.S. 695; Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678; Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation
v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656; and W.M.C.A. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633. One week later
the Court handed down eight additional decisions: Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565; Pin-
ney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564; Hearne v. Symlie, 378 U.S. 563; Marshall v.
Hare, 378 U.S. 561; Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S. 560; Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S.
558; Nolan v. Rhodes, 378 U.S. 556; and Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553.
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that followed, a number of states advanced the policy of preserving the
integrity of political subdivisions as a rational basis for deviations from
the one-man, one-vote standard. They argued that fair representation
in their states revolved around more than mathematically perfect dis-
tricting, that representation of homogeneous groups and political subdivi-
sions should not be compromised merely to comply with an inflexible
standard.24  Their arguments fell on deaf ears. The Court moved un-,
abashedly in refining the standard to permit only de minimis deviations, 25
and expanded its embrace to include local apportionment.26
The Court's conception of what constituted fair representation, as em-
bodied in the one-man, one-vote standard, seemed to many to be judi-
cial myopia. The Court's intentions notwithstanding, the standard severely
burdened the states, 27 and proved to be conducive to unassailable gerry-
mandering. District lines could be placed in any configuration, yet es-
cape judicial scrutiny merely because the districts created were equally
populated. 28
In 1973 the Court responded by handing down Mahan v. Howell,29
a landmark decision hailed as a "reform of a reform."30  Virginia
had apportioned itself with a mind to the representation of its various
political subdivisions pursuant to its constitution, resulting in population
deviations among its House districts. Though denying any broad depar-
ture from the basic one-man, one-vote standard, the Court validated Vir-
ginia's plan by holding that a policy of maintaining the integrity of polit-
ical subdivisions represented a rational basis for deviations from the
standard.
24. See Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Priesler, 394
U.S. 526 (1969); Swan v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
25. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967).
26. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); and Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
See also Martin, The Constitutional Status of Local Government Reapportionment,
6 VAL. U.L. REV. 237 (1972).
27. By virtue of the Swann decision the Court impliedly invalidated judicially
approved plans for some twenty-five states. Dixon, supra note 17, at 445.
28. With the advent of the application of the computer to districting, the one-
man, one-vote standard was but another linear constraint in a computer program.
For examples of this unassailable gerrymandering, see Edwards, supra note 19, and
Skolnick v. State Electoral Bd., 336 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. I11. 1971).
29. 410 U.S. 315 (1973). See generally Note, Constitutional Law-Mahan v.
Howell-Forward Or Backward For The One-Man-One-Vote Rule, 22 DEPAUL L.
REV. 912 (1973).
30. Broder, Reform of a Reform, Chicago Sun-Times, March 11, 1973, at 37,
col. 4.
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Prior to the Mahan decision, an innovation in districting had become
popular as states strived to district in a manner that would afford their
political subdivisions representation. In effect, the Court's reapportion-
ment standard precipitated increased use of multimember districting,3 '
albeit, with contrasting ramifications, if not intent. Multimember dis-
tricting enabled representation of large homogeneously populated areas
(e.g., cities or counties), whereas single-member districting, by reason of
the demand for near perfect mathematical equality, might well result in
the breaking up of such homogeneous groups.3 2  Yet, multimember dis-
tricting could well produce very different results. A segment of a multi-
member district, such as a ghetto, could by itself approximate the size
of a single-member district and be represented as a unit. But, by reason
of its minority status within the much larger multimember district, it
would exert far less, if any, influence on the at-large elections, and
,thereby be denied representation that would have been available under a
single-member district plan.3 3  Such "cancellation" of voter influence,
though a more subtle form of discrimination, is certainly no less invidious.
The instant case is precisely on point. Texas' use of multimember
31. Comment, Effective Representation And Multimember Districts, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 1577 (1970). It is worth noting that in 1963 a number of states had explic-
itly rejected multimember districting.. See Dixon, Apportionment Standards and.'Ju-
dicial Power, 38 NoTRE DAME LAW. 367, 394 (1963). See also Banzhaf, Multi-
member Electoral Districts---Do They Violate the 'One Man, One Vote' Principle,
75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966).
32. In Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 323-24 (1973), one of the reasons for
upholding Virginia's plan and vacating the district court's plan was the diluting ef-
fect the latter's plan would have had on the voters of Scott County. Scott County
had a population of 24,000, which Virginia had included in a district of 76,000.
The district court placed 6,000 Scott County voters in a district of 87,000, leaving
18,000 to be absorbed into a district of 76,000, with the result that Scott County
was virtually unrepresented.
33.
Multimember districting is particularly conducive to the dilution of interest
group voting strength because a greater number of voters must be members
of an interest group in order for that group to control election results in a
multimember district than would be necessary in a single-member district.
68 MICH. L. REV. 1577, supra note 31, at 1586.
Note must be taken of an issue never properly addressed within the context of
the multimember districting problem. The issue arises out of the fact that the four-
teenth amendment protects individuals against discrimination, but does it protect in-
terest groups? Even then, who or what constitutes a judicially recognizable interest
group? It will be seen shortly, that no great amount of consideration of the ques-
tion was necessary for the courts to abandon interest groups and, in their place,
turn to the suspect classification of race as the only practical plaintiffs for whom
allegations of discrimination by reason of multimember districting could be enter-
tained. See note 77, infra.
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and single-member districts precipitated black and Mexican-American
challenges on the grounds of the above described invidious effects of its
plan. Such cases are not novel to the Court, as will be seen shortly.
But White v. Regester is unique, for it represents the first occasion
upon which the Court sustained a district court invalidation of a state re-
apportionment plan, based expressly on the grounds of the invidious ef-
fects of multimember districting. Further import of the decision lies in
the growing use of multimember districting by states in reapportionment
of their legislatures.
The remainder of this note will analyze White v. Regester in light of
previous multimember districting cases in an effort to define Court doc-
trine with respect to the necessary elements for a successful challenge to
such plans. This analysis will begin with a history of the Court's decisions
on the issue, including tangential holdings of substantial relevance, fol-
lowed by a review of both the district court and Supreme Court opinions
in White.
THE COURTS AND MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTING
Cancellation
Shortly after the Reynolds decision some commentators began to con-
sider the representation problems of multimember districting, even though
Reynolds seemingly approved of its use.3 4  In the companion case of
Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly,3 5 though expressly finding no un-
constitutionality,"6 the Court did make note of some of the shortcomings
of multimember districting.3 7
In late 1964, a three-judge district court in Georgia struck down Geor-
gia's state senatorial reapportionment plan.38 By statute, Georgia had
apportioned its senatorial districts, all equally populated, with respect to
its counties. Less popluated areas were made into districts composed of
two or more counties, while the heavily populated counties were divided
into districts. For these counties, however, senators were elected at-
34. 377 U.S. 533, 576-77 (1964). See Dixon, supra note 3 1, at 394-95.
35. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
36. Id. at 731 n.21.
37. Ballots were long and cumbersome, and an intelligent choice among
candidates for seats in the legislature was made quite difficult. No identi-
fiable constituencies within the populous counties resulted, and the resi-
dents of those areas had no single member of the Senate or House elected
specifically to represent them.
Id.
38. Dorsey v. Fortson, 228 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
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large.39  The plaintiffs asserted that, unlike voters of single-member
districts, they would be denied the right to elect a representative for their
district.40 The district court gave the plaintiffs summary judgment upon
findings of "a clear difference in the treatment accorded voters in each
of the two classes of senatorial districts," 41 and invidious discrimination
by reason of this "classification of voters in senatorial districts on the basis
of homesite .... "42
On appeal one year later, the Supreme Court reversed in Fortson v.
Dorsey.43  The Court began by citing Reynolds, holding that Georgia's
desire to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions was a legitimate
state policy, and further, that the sole concern of the equal protection
argument was that all votes be "approximately equal in weight." 44
The Court relied on the facts that the districts were equally populated,
legislators had to be residents of different districts within the counties,
and further, that at-large elections insured representation of county in-
terests. Yet, the Court went on to say:
Our opinion is not to be understood to say that in all instances, or under all
circumstances, such a system as Georgia has will comport with the dic-
tates of the Equal Protection Clause. It might well be that, designedly or
otherwise, a multimember constituency apportionment scheme, under the
circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel
out the voting population. When this is demonstrated it will be time
enough to consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster. 45
The Court seemed to have asserted a doctrine to protect the voting
power of groups threatened by an apportionment plan. But as one com-
mentator noted, indications of types and quantities of evidence neces-
39. Id. at 261-62. Seven counties were divided into from two to seven districts,
the largest being Fulton County, containing Atlanta.
40. Plaintiffs asserted that on the basis of the population of the various districts
of Fulton County, only 18 percent of the voters in the other six districts could null-
ify the unanimous choice of the seventh district, and "thrust a representative upon
voters of that district." Id. at 262.
41. Id. at 263.
42. Id. The homesite classification was found violative of the equal protection
clause in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
43. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
44.
The Equal Protection argument is focused solely upon the question of
whether county-wide voting in the several multimember districted counties
results in denying the residents therein a vote "approximately equal in weight
to that of" voters resident in the single-member districts.
Id. at 436, citing 377 U.S. 533, 579.
45. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
1974]
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sary for such protection were lacking.40  Indeed, the lower courts re-
jected several challenges for lack of evidence of cancellation, 47 including
Mann v. Davis,48 where blacks challenged the inclusion of 42 per cent
black populated Richmond into a multimember district, thereby reducing
the percentage of the black population therein to 29 per cent.49 The dis-
trict court rejected the challenge on the grounds that there had been no
showing of racial discrimination,50 and that cancellation was not proved
merely because a race was not represented by a like legislator. 51 The
Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. 2
However, a district court in Hawaii invalidated a senate apportionment
plan containing multimember districts with identical house constituen-
cies.53  The court applied Fortson in finding that "designedly or other-
wise ' 54 such a plan created "built-in disproportionate representational
advantages" to voters not residing in these house-senate multimember
districts.5 5 In Burns v. Richardson,56 the Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that there was nothing unconstitutional per se in both houses of a state
legislature being multimember districted, 57 and, more importantly, that
the record revealed no evidence of the cancelled-out effect Fortson re-
quired. 58 The Court elaborated:
It may be that this invidious effect can more easily be shown if, in con-
trast to the facts in Fortson, districts are large in relation to the total
number of legislators, if districts are not appropriately subdistricted to
assure distribution of legislators that are resident over the entire district,
or if such districts characterize both houses of a bicameral legislature rather
than one. 59
46. Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment: Multi-member Districts And Fair
Representation, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 666, 674 (1972).
47. Stout v. Bottorff, 246 F. Supp. 825 (S.D. Ind. 1965); Davis v. Cameron,
238 F. Supp. 462 (S.D. Iowa 1965).
48. 245 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Va. 1965).
49. Id. at 244-45.
50. Id. at 245.
51. Id.
52. Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965).
53. Holt v. Richardson, 240 F. Supp. 724 (D. Hawaii 1965). The plan was
produced by the legislature pursuant to a court order in Holt v. Richardson, 238
F. Supp. 468 (D. Hawaii 1965).
54. Id. at 731.
55. Id. at 729.
56. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
57. Id. at 88.
58. Id. The Court chastized the lower court for relying on "conjecture" rather
than demonstrated facts.
59. Id.
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Arguably, this standard of proof falied to be meaningful, for the plan up-
held by the Burns Court squarely met all three conditions.
Denial of Access
Nonetheless, the stage seemed to be set for a successful challenge to
multimember districting when the Court decided to review Chavis v.
Whitcomb.61 A challenge had been made to Indiana's apportionment of
Marion County, containing Indianapolis, into a multimember district, on the
ground that a "cognizable minority interest group" with "unusual interests
in specific areas of substantive law" had been invidiously discriminated
against by reason of the dilution of its voting influence resulting from such
districting.6 2  The district court began by identifying a ghetto within
Indianapolis, by means of voluminous evidence. 63 The court then noted
the gaping disparity in representation of this ghetto, as manifested by the
residences of the legislators among the townships of the county.6 4 The
court next concluded that the at-large elected legislators tend to repre-
sent the majority, "[obviating] representation of a substantial, though
minority, interest group within that common constituency."65 Further, it
noted party control of nominations and the resulting necessity for a leg-
islator to comply with the majority of the delegation. 66 The court there-
upon held that the plan operated to minimize and cancel out the voting
strength of a minority racial group, and further, that the circumstances
suggested by Burns as demonstrating the Fortson cancellation, were all
present. 67
In 1971 the Supreme Court handed down Whitcomb v. Chavis.68
Writing for the majority, Justice White began by once again reiterating
60. Carpeneti, supra note 46, at 677.
61. 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969), prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 984 (1970).
62. Id. at 1367-68.
63. Id. at 1371-83. See also Note, Constitutional Law-Multi-member Dis-
tricting As A Violation Of Equal Protection, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 552-53.
64. Id. at 1383-85. A relatively wealthy suburban area, representing 13.98 per-
cent of Marion County's population, was the residence of 47.52 percent of the coun-
ty's senators and 34.33 percent of its representatives, while the ghetto area, with
17.8 percent of the population, had 4.75 percent of the senators and 5.97 percent
of the representatives.
65.. Id. at 1385 (emphasis added). The court added, "partial responsiveness of
all legislators is [not] . . . equal [to] total responsiveness and informed concern
of a few specific legislators." Id. at 1386.
66. Id. at 1386.
67. Id. at 1386-87.
68. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented,
on the ground that the district court's decision had been correctly predicated upon
Fortson, and that its findings should not be disturbed. 403 U.S. at 180.
1974]
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Fortson,69 but found the theory of the district court's holding wholly defi-
cient.70 As in Mann v. Davis, the Court noted that there had been no
showing of intent,71 and went on to emphasize
the fact that the number of ghetto residents who were legislators was not
in proportion to the ghetto population [does not] satisfactorily prove
invidious discrimination absent evidence and findings that ghetto residents
had less opportunity than did other Marion County residents to participate
in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.72
Indeed, the Court noted that Republicans won four of the five elections
from 1960 to 1968, that the ghetto voted heavily Democratic, and
that in the one election the Democrats did win, in 1964, nine residents of
the ghetto were slated, five of whom won:78
The voting power of ghetto residents may have been "cancelled out" as
the District Court held, but this seems a mere euphemism for political de-
feat at the polls.74
To sustain the district court, Justice White wrote, would be
expressive of the more general proposition that any group with distinctive
interests must be represented in the legislative halls if it is numerous
enough to command at least one seat and represents a majority living in
an area sufficiently compact to constitute a single-member district.76
The Court had come face-to-face with the most profound issue of demo-
cratic political theory, surely recalling Justice Frankfurter's warnings
about entering the "political thicket."76 Judicial protection of interest
groups, the Court said, was an untenable proposition.77
69. Id. at 143.
70. Id. at 148-49.
71. That the Court should make this observation in spite of Fortson's "designedly
or otherwise" holding would take on substantial meaning with respect to supplanting
the interest group concept with the suspect classification of race-where some de-
gree of intent, present or past, de facto or de jure, clearly shown or imputed, is
necessarily vital. See note 93, infra.
72. 403 U.S. 124, 149 (emphasis added).
We have discovered nothing in the record or in the court's findings in-
dicating that poor Negroes were not allowed to vote, to choose the politi-
cal party they desired to support, to participate in the affairs or be equally
represented on those occasions when legislative candidates were chosen.
Nor did the evidence purport to show or the court find that inhabitants of
the ghetto were regularly excluded from the slates of both major parties,
thus denying them the chance of occupying legislative seats.
Id. at 149-50.
73. Id. at 150-52.
74. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 156.
76. Indeed, Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion made precisely that recollec-
tion. See note 18, supra.
77. Id. at 156-57. See Carly and Shanahan, Supreme Court Declares New Stand-
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The Fortson doctrine was not dead, but it had been radically altered
by Whitcomb: "Cancellation" of voting tsrength was now a subordinate
adjunct to "denial of access to the political system," for the former would
be but one, albeit, highly visible, manifestation of the latter. Only in
this manner could the Court hope to distinguish between defeat at the
polls and the abridgement of fundamental, constitutionally protected,
rights. But, what constituted "denial of access?" Seemingly, the answer
was to be found in a line of voting rights cases-cases revolving around
historical traditions of racial discrimination. 78
Willingness to Intervene
Even before the advent of The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 the courts
had displayed a willingness to intervene in apportionment cases where ra-
cial discrimination was evident: Only with great hesitation has the Su-
preme Court entered the area of gerrymandering, 80 yet in 1960, the
Court struck down a blatantly racially gerrymandered plan.81 Indeed,
an Alabama district court invalidated a multimember districted plan upon
a finding of intent to cancel out the voting strength of resident blacks.82
Of note was the manner in which the court arrived at this finding of intent
-by considering the "pattern and practice of discrimination in Alabama
as a backdrop. 8s3
In 1969, the Supreme Court included changes from single-member to
ard of Proof For Groups Alleging Submergence in a Multi-member District, 3 SETON
HALL L. REV. 178 (1971), and Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAv.
L. REV. 40, 135 (1971).
78. Carpeneti, supra note 46, at 685.
79. Voting Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970). The Act covers any state or
locality, which in 1964 or 1968, used a literacy test and had less than a 50 percent
voter registration or turnout. The Act suspends all such devices for five years, and
requires these states to get federal clearance of all changes in election laws before
implementing them. Seven southern states and scattered counties of a few others
fall within the purview of the Act.
80. See Edwards, supra note 19.
81. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
82. Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
83.
[Considering the] pattern and practice of discrimination in Alabama as a
backdrop, the cavalier treatment accorded predominantly Negro counties
in the House plan takes on added meaning. The court is permitted to find
the intent of the legislature from consistency of inherent probabilities in-
ferred from the record as a whole. We therefore hold that the Legisla-
ture intentionally aggregated predominantly Negro counties with predom-
inantly white counties for the sole purpose of preventing election of Ne-
groes to House membership.
Id. at 109.
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multimember districting among those changes in election laws requiring
federal clearance under the Voting Rights Act.84 Such a holding was nec-
essary, the Court explained, because of the threat of cancellation multi-
member districting posed to racial minorities. 85 The Court reaffirmed
this holding two years later.8
Shortly after Whitcomb, an Alabama district court once again struck
down a multimember districted plan,87 distinguishing its holding from
the Whitcomb decision in that, unlike Indiana, Alabama had a "long
history of racial discrimination."88  Of perhaps greater moment was the
Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. McKeithen,s9 handed down in early
1973. Faced with selecting one of two proposed single-member districting
plans, a Mississippi district court selected the one most advantageous to
blacks.90 The Fifth Circuit Court reversed with respect to this selection,
insisting that the district court be "colorblind." 91  The Supreme Court
reversed the circuit court, adding by way of footnote:
In Whitcomb it was conceded that the State's preference for multimember
districting was not rooted in racial discrimination. Here, however there
has been no concession and, indeed, the district court found a long "his-
tory" of bias and franchise dilution in the State's drawing of lines.92
It is important to note that the Court spoke not of intent, but of a history
of racial discrimination.9"
INVALIDATION OF MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTING
Graves v. Barnes,94 as stated previously, represented a hearing on
the consolidation of four suits filed in four district courts, challenging
84. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S 544 (1969).
85. Id. at 569. "Voters who are members of a racial minority might well be
in the majority in one district, but in a decided minority in the county as a whole.
This type of change could therefore nullify their ability to elect the candidate of
their choice, just as would prohibiting some of them from voting." Id.
86. Perkins v. Mathews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
87. Sims v. Amos, 336 F. Supp. 924 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
88. Id. at 569. "Whitcomb arose in Indiana, a state without the long history
of racial discrimination evident in Alabama. Thus we feel justified in pointing out
that in Alabama it is reasonable to conclude that multimember districts tend to dis-
criminate against the black population." Id.
89. 407 U.S. 191 (1972).
90. Bussie v. Governor of Louisiana, 333 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. La. 1971).
91. 457 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971).
92. 407 U.S. at 193 n.3 (emphasis added).
93. See Derfner, Multi-member Districts and Black Voters, 2 BLACK L.J. 170
(1972).
94. 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Texas 1972).
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Texas' newly promulgated reapportionment plan on grounds of racial
gerrymandering of senatorial districts in Houston, impermissable popula-
tion deviations among house districts, and cancellation of black and
Mexican-American voter strength in Dallas and Bexar counties by rea-
son of multimember districting.95 The three-judge court approved the
senate plan for lack of evidence of the alleged racial gerrymandering. 96
The court, however, found unconstitutional disparities in population among
the house districts.97 But, of greater significance was the court's finding
that the use of multimember districting in Dallas and Bexar Counties
tended to cancel out the votes of resident black and Mexican-American
voters therein. The court thus invalidated the plan, "in accordance with
the standards of Whitcomb.' 98
The court began by reciting the Fortson standard of cancellation, and
the Whitcomb standard of denial of access.9 9 Detailing salient features
of the Texas electoral system,100 the court noted: "[U]nlike the State
of Indiana, Texas has a rather colorful history of . . .racial discrimina-
tion."' 1  The Dallas plaintiffs showed not only that the number of leg-
islators resident in the black community was not remotely in proportion
to the number of ghetto voters, but "also that the black community has
been effectively excluded from participation in the Democratic primary
selection process."' 01 2  This showing revolved around evidence that:
successful nomination and election in Dallas was extremely difficult
without the endorsement of the Dallas Committee for Responsible Govern-
ment (DCRG); white candidates endorsed by the DCRG could win a
95. These four suits were brought between the day the plan was first promul-
gated, October 22, andNovember 24, 1971. The suits were Graves v. Barnes, Reg-
ester v. Bullock, Marriott v. Smith, and Archer v. Smith. In addition, the Texas
AFL-CIO and Bexar County Mexican-Americans were permitted to intervene.
96. 343 F. Supp. at 734-35.
97. Id. at 711-13. See note 15, supra.
98. Id. at 727, 733. The court also noted two additional grounds for invali-
dating the multimember districting scheme: the disparate treatment of Houston
County, and the substantially greater cost of conducting a campaign in a multimem-
ber district. The court nonetheless indicated its appreciation that such grounds, inde-
pendent of others, would be insufficient to invalidate a plan. For references to the
former issue, see Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa. 1964); and Kruid-
emier v. McCullock, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d 355 (1966). As to the latter,
see Goldblatt v. City of Dallas, 414 F.2d 774, 775 (5th Cir. 1969).
99. 343 F. Supp. at 724.
100. Id. These features included: a majority requirement in the primary, a
"place" requirement on the ballot, and an absence of legislative residency require-
ments within individual districts of the multimember district.
101. Id. at 725.
102. Id. at 726. "As a factual matter, Negroes in Dallas County vote primarily
. . .Democratic." Id.
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county-wide race without appealing to black voters; the DCRG decides
how many blacks, if any, it will slate without the assistance of black
community leaders; throughout the 1950's, Dallas legislators led the fight
for segregation in the legislature; and the DCRG still used racial campaign
tactics. 103
With respect to Bexar County and the Mexican-American plaintiffs,
the court first noted that "Chicanos, as well as Blacks, require the pro-
tective intervention of the Federal Courts. ' 10 4  In establishing these
plaintiffs as an identifiable racial minority, 10 5 the court traced the judicial
history of findings of discrimination against Mexican-Americans, their
poverty and their cultural disorientation.'10  The court concluded:
[These] impediment[s], conjoined with the poll tax and the most restric-
tive voter registration procedures in the nation, have operated to effectively
deny Mexican-Americans access to the political processes in Texas even
longer than blacks were formally denied access by the white primary. 107
In addition, the court took judicial notice of the fact that only five
Mexican-Americans had served in the Texas Legislature since 1880.108
In doing so the court acknowledged the Whitcomb maxim that lack of
representation is not proof of denial of access, but interpreted Justice
White's opinion as indicating that such facts, considered in conjunction
with others, would be persuasive. 1 9 Further, the court noted, such
facts "often provide the best evidence to determine whether votes are cast
103. Id. at 726-27. "In essence, we find that the plaintiffs have shown that
Negroes in Dallas County are permitted to enter the political process in any mean-
ingful manner only through the benevolence of the dominant white majority." ld.
104. Id. at 727.
105. Id. Citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
106. Id. at 728-31.
107. Id. at 731. Mexican-American voter registration and turnout were approxi-
mately 30 percent. The court commented:
[W]e draw very different conclusions than does the state from the fact
that Mexican-Americans register and vote in such low numbers. The state
uses those facts to argue that the Mexican-Americans need political orga-
nization, not redistricting. We use those facts . . . [to] conclude that the
reason that the voter participation . . . is so low is that their voting pat-
terns were established under precisely the same sort of discriminatory State
actions that we have already found both relevant and condemnatory with
regard to Dallas Blacks.
Id. at 733.
108. Id. at 732.
109. Id. Nonetheless, the court was emphatic in noting: "We are not to be
understood as saying, and indeed specifically disavow, any intention of implying that
'any group with distinctive interests' must be represented in the legislative halls.
." Id. at 734.
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on racial lines."' 110 The court thereby concluded that race was still an
important issue in the Bexar county,"' and that
[b]ecause of the continued and continuing discrimination against Mexi-
can-Americans in Bexar County, they are effectively removed from the
political processes of Bexar, in violation of all of the Whitcomb stand-
ards .... 112
The court thereupon adopted a single-member districting plan for
Dallas and Bexar Counties to be used in the 1972 elections.' 13  A week
later Justice Powell denied a stay of judgment,"14 and several months later
the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction." 5
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in February, 1973, and on
June 18, handed down White v. Regester. 1 6 As in Whitcomb, Justice
White wrote for the majority. 117 All but four pages of the opinion dealt
with the issue of population deviations, upon which the Court based its
reversal."18 However, the Court affirmed with respect to the invalida-
tion of multimember districting in Dallas and Bexar Counties.
The Court reiterated the Whitcomb standard and found that the dis-
trict court had displayed "due regard" for its dictates. 119 It specifically
reviewed the district court's findings, 120 noted that the district court had
not made its decision upon a holding that every racial or political group
has a constitutional right to be represented,' 21 and concluded:
On the record before us, we are not inclined to overturn these findings,
representing as they do a blend of history and an intensely local ap-
praisal of the design and impact of the . . . multimember districts in
the light of past and present reality, political or otherwise.122
110. Id. at 732.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 733.
113. Id. at 736. The court, however, suspended the residency requirement-that
each legislator be a resident of a different district-for the impending 1972 election.
114. Graves v. Barnes, 405 U.S. 1201 (1972).
115. 409 U.S. 840 (1972).
116. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
117. Dissents were offered only with respect to the population deviations is-
sue.
118. Id. at 765.
119.
The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings that
the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally
open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less
opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the po-
litical processes and elect legislators of their choice.
Id.
120. Id. at 765-68.
121. Id. at 769.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion has illustrated, multimember districting
raises fundamental questions of what constitutes fair representation-
questions that, by their very nature, will never be easily answerable. It
is clear that multimember districting lends itself to the effectuation of
the most valid of state policies-representation of homogeneous groups
and political subdivisions, as well as the most invidious type of discrimi-
nation-cancellation of minority voting strength. It is likewise clear that
disappointing election results should not give rise to a claim of such dis-
crimination.
Since the Supreme Court first recognized the discriminatory potential
of multimember districting in Fortson, its efforts have been directed to
the definition of standards that distinguish between "mere defeat at the
polls" and invidious discrimination by reason of the cancellation effect
of multimember districting. To effectuate this distinction the Court
promulgated the Whitcomb standard of "denial of access to the political
processes."
In rejecting the allegations of the Whitcomb challengers, the Court
stated:
We have discovered nothing in the record or in the court's findings indi-
cating that poor Negroes were not allowed to register or vote, to
choose the political party they desired to support, to participate in the af-
fairs or to be equally represented on those occasions when legislative candi-
dates were chosen. Nor did the evidence purport to show or the court
find that inhabitants of the ghetto were regularly excluded from the
slates of both major parties, thus denying them the chance of occupying
legislative seats.' 23
That same year, the Court handed down a decision in which it said,
• . . the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of meaning-
ful and unjustified official distinctions based on race. 124
No small degree of discrimination could possibly result in the evidentiary
findings the Whitcomb Court deemed necessary for a showing of denial
of access. Such findings could arise only at the behest of traditions-
or a "history"--of discrimination. Historical discrimination necessarily
raised the specter of race, implying that the "suspect classifactions" doc-
trine of the fourteenth amendment shadowed judicial thinking where
multimember districting was challenged. Indeed, the voting rights cases
mirrored the Court's recognition of de facto discrimination in civil rights
cases-proof of intent to discriminate had been supplanted by imputed
123. 403 U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971).
124. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
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intent derived from the histories of racial discrimination. 125 It was no
accident then, that the White v. Regester district court began its findings
with its judicial notice of Texas' "colorful history of racial discrimina-
tion." This finding laid the foundation for each and every finding Whit-
comb had enumerated as necessary for a successful showing of denial
of access.
Seemingly, then, there are three elements to a successful challenge to
multimember districting upon an allegation of cancellation. The first is
statistical evidence that there is a racial minority group whose size and
geographic concentration would enable it to elect a legislator in a single-
member districted plan. The second is evidence of an enduring history of
racial discrimination. The third is evidence of exclusion from the nomina-
tion and election processes.
Legislative representation and reapportionment are so inextricably bound
together that the Court has necessarily felt restrained in entering an area
admittedly easily affected by invidiously discriminatory schemes. It is
highly doubtful that there exists a judicial standard that would completely
preclude such discrimination. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has de-
fined three elements that constitute a standard that may serve to prevent
the undermining of that most fundamental right incident to citizenship in
a democracy-the right to representation.
Robert I. Schwimmer
125. See note 83 supra.
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